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To date, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has undergone an 
excessive amount of reforms including topics such as student-athlete well-being, academics, 
enforcement, resource allocation, and so forth. However, despite the constant stream of policy 
reforms there has been a significant lack of effective reform initiatives with reference to the 
economic state of the NCAA. This void is partially due to the lack of sufficient empirical 
evidence surrounding the economic discussion of college athletics, specifically in regards to the 
discussion of the potential for performance based compensation for student-athletes. Past 
research for such compensation has focused primarily on large revenue producing sports such as 
football and men’s basketball (Brown, 1993; 2011; Brown & Jewell, 2006). However, by only 
examining two of the almost ninety NCAA recognized sports it has created a large gap in the 
literature necessary to examine things further. 
Considering this, the current research intends to expand the scope of the literature by 
using an econometrics approach to investigate the current state of the NCAA non-revenue 
producing sport of swimming. The research will use public NCAA economic revenue and 
expenditure reports to create a revenue function and conduct a multiple regression analysis. The 
attempt of such research is to determine the marginal revenue product (MRP) and economic 
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Sport literature has continuously produced evidence supporting the theory that the NCAA  
operates as a cartel (Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 1992) restricting production and competition 
(Eckard, 1998; Kahn, 2007). That is, the NCAA falls into the classic definition of a cartel in 
undertaking certain actions such as monitoring the behavior of member institutions, levying 
sanctions against programs which violate regulations (Zimbalist, 1999), as well as imposing 
monetary restrictions on student-athlete compensation, employee salaries, and recruiting 
expenses (Fleisher et al., 1992). At the same time, the overall revenue pool for the NCAA and its 
member institutions has continued to increase, driven by the growth in revenues derived from 
various sources such as television broadcast rights (Fort, 2006; Sandy & Sloane, 2004). Thus 
with the development of the NCAA as a large business, one major criticism which has emerged 
has been the exploitation and underpayment of student-athletes (Lanter & Hawkins, 2013). 
Indeed, while the NCAA has continued to evolve rules governing the definition of what types of 
compensation are acceptable for student-athletes, it is the case that many of these individuals 
produce economic value well in excess of the cost of attendance provided by their schools 
(Brown, 2011). 
As a result, such restrictions on the allowed compensation of student-athletes has limited 
the effective pay for a top performing athlete to a maximum of $36,000. These restrictions have 
caused student-athletes to use their media publicity to actively campaign for reform initiatives 
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within NCAA financial compensation (Farrey, 2013). They have continued to fight for their 
identification as employees of their respected universities in an effort to receive some form of 
performance based compensation, commonly referred to as pay for play. 
Many economists believe that it is through such control of player income that the NCAA 
has become a monopsony power in the player-recruitment market. The primary approach that has 
been used to examine the rents generated by student-athletes in the NCAA has been to estimate 
the MRP of top-level student-athletes through modeling changes in revenue for athletic 
departments by taking into factors such as: the number of players drafted, market potential, team 
performance, and so forth (Brown, 1993; Brown & Jewell, 2006). Notably, previous research on 
the MRP of premium college athletes has centered mainly around high revenue producing sports 
such as football and both men’s and women’s basketball (Brown, 1993; 1994). Such studies have 
shown that elite college players can generate a marginal revenue product that far exceeds their 
effective compensation which therefore produces a substantial economic rent for their respective 
institutions (Brown, 1993; 1994).  
Given this, to date there has still been limited empirical examinations of the value created 
by student-athletes who compete for NCAA institutions (Brown and Jewell, 2006). However, as 
the NCAA continues to grow further away from the Collegiate Model and deeper into the 
commercialization of big business, the compensation of student-athletes will progress to the 
forefront of potential collegiate reforms (Southall & Staurowsky, 2013; Benford, 2007). Despite 
this, current research has excluded non-revenue generating sport from the evaluation of athletic 
department commercialization thus omitting them from the potential context for NCAA 
economic reform. In consequence, this exclusion has allowed the NCAA to avoid initiating such 
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reforms due to their inability to include all athletes. This discourse has created a divide between 
revenue and non-revenue generating sport. 
Considering this, the focus of the current research is to try and provide an alternative 
viewpoint in the discussion of the economic value and potential for performance based 
compensation for student-athletes. As no prior research has tried to put a monetary value on the 
MRP that is produced by athletes outside of basketball or football this study will attempt to 
expand the literature by examining the economic value of NCAA swimmers. NCAA swimmers 
are a group who is classified by the NCAA as being a non-revenue generating sport and thus is 
often ignored in the discussion of player compensation reform.  
In concluding, the current study attempts to make a number of important contributions to 
the sport economic literature. First, by considering a context outside of football or basketball, 
this study attempts to extend the understanding of the value generated by student-athletes outside 
of the realm of the sports producing the majority of revenues in the NCAA. Second, this study 
also provides further theoretical consideration of the cartel nature of the NCAA in regards to 
capturing rents from student-athletes extending beyond the realm of football and basketball. That 
is, if a swimmer who is able to make it to the Olympics is able to produce additional revenues for 
their program, then cartel theory argues that there would be incentive to violate recruiting 
regulations to secure the talents of these elite athletes. In other words, the findings have 
important implications in not only understanding how much revenue that student-athletes may 
produce for schools, but also in regards to the setting of regulations in college athletics. Finally, 
as the NCAA, athletic conferences, and member institutions continue to examine how much 
stipends should be paid to college athletes, the estimates from the Generalized Least Squares 
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(GLS) regression models may provide further discussion in considering what is an appropriate 







 CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Formation of the NCAA 
 
  The roots of intercollegiate athletics can be traced to colonial America where student 
loyalties to their “class” commonly superseded those to their university (Flowers, 2009). At this 
time, sport was often used as a tool of indoctrination for incoming freshmen, and served as a 
basis for the beginning of student led administration of college athletics (Sack & Staurowsky, 
1998). Integral to this introduction to class allegiance was a sporting event known as “Bloody 
Monday,” which was a mix between soccer and rugby that ultimately resembled what we 
recognize today as football (Lucas & Smith, 1978). From this, these competitions held in the 
early 1800’s served as the impetus for future collegiate sport contests throughout the academic 
year such as baseball and field hockey (Richardson, 1932).  
In the early 1800’s, colleges were isolated due to limited communication and 
transportation systems which significantly restricted the ability for inter-collegiate competition to 
develop (Lucas and Smith, 1978). However, upon the introduction of the railroad which gave 
universities the opportunity to travel easily and therefore instilled a desire for competitive 
conquest, this concept of class based intra-collegiate sport competition quickly developed into 
intercollegiate athletics (Flowers, 2009). This eagerness to compete sparked the first official 
intercollegiate sporting competition between the Harvard and Yale crew teams in a rowing 
regatta in 1852 (Flowers, 2009).  
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Throughout the years, intercollegiate athletics continued to thrive off of this highly 
competitive spirit and expanded from crew into other sports such as baseball and football. By the 
1880s football had superseded crew to become the college sport of greatest interest to both 
competitors and fans (Oriard, 2012). As intercollegiate sport continued to grow further away 
from the once student led organization that it originated as and deeper into a highly competitive 
enterprise, an apparent need for inter-institutional athletic regulation arose (Smith, 1983). The 
first college faculty athletic committee was organized at Princeton in the early 1880’s to settle 
athletic based disputes. Other universities formed similar committees in response to varying 
issues as they arose within the athletic departments. However, none of these independent 
committees worked together to initiate intercollegiate policies which caused a lack of 
cooperation within the management of college athletics (Smith & Abbott, 1983). Thus, when a 
group of Midwestern university presidents gathered in January of 1985 to discuss the regulation 
and control of intercollegiate athletics, this meeting was an important turning point towards the 
growth of institutional control of sport within U.S. colleges. In the following year, this group 
would be officially founded as the Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, the 
first organized group of intercollegiate athletic authorities (Smith & Abbott, 1983).  
Undeterred by the formation of a semi-national governing body for intercollegiate 
athletics, the ever growing violence in football caused by brutal formations and war-like tactics 
led to increasing public outrage over the game. Based on this, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt 
intervened, demanding that colleges become involved in the organization and operation of 
athletics to provide athletes with more protection (Oriard, 2012). This presidential intervention 
sparked a revision of the rules governing football in attempt to make the game safer for the 
athletes as the evidence of long-term consequences pertaining to traumatic head injuries were on 
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the rise (Oriard, 2012). These reforms were initiated by a group of 62 higher-education 
institutions who formed the first charter of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United 
States (IAAUS) which was renamed in 1910 as the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA, 2012a). Thus the NCAA was formed which shifted the control of college athletics away 
from the students and into the possession of university administration. 
Commercialization of College Sport 
Despite the recent boom of big business in intercollegiate athletics in America, the 
commercialization process dates back to the earliest sport competitions between universities. 
That is, even as far back as the mid-1800’s, corporations and universities saw the potential 
benefits that could be drawn from partnerships which monetized the popularity of sport contests 
between students (Smith, 1990). The earliest example of this was in the 1852 Harvard-Yale 
Regatta which was sponsored by the Boston Montreal Railroad Company who provided free 
passage to any part of Lake Winnipesaukee and covered the travel expenses of all student 
competitors (Smith, 1990). In this, the Boston Montreal Railroad Company’s vision was that by 
hosting the first official sport competition between two of the most prestigious universities in the 
world, they would in turn garner a large number of spectators who would purchase railroad 
tickets to attend the event. While the initial Harvard-Yale Regatta in 1852 drew only about 1,000 
spectators, by 1859, the competition had grown to around 20,000 attendees (Lewis, 1967), 
indicating that there was indeed lucrative financial potential for hosting large scale 
intercollegiate sporting events.  
Over the years universities have harnessed the commercial potential that intercollegiate 
sport offers and have allowed their athletic programs to act as commercial enterprises used to 
increase enrollment and public support via large scale marketing opportunities (Flowers, 2009). 
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Universities originally fought back against the idea of organized athletics, with the belief that 
athletic participation strayed too far from the academic mission of higher education (Davis, 
2007). It was not until intercollegiate athletics was shown to provide new student recruitment 
opportunities and increase the overall esteem of the university, were they universally accepted by 
institutional leaders (Lucas & Smith, 1978).  
This venerated view of intercollegiate athletics has grown throughout the years into 
something that no longer holds any resemblance to the once student led organization it began as 
(Staurowsky, Maxcy, Karcher, Southall, Berri, & Otto, 2015). Continued commercialization 
movements across the NCAA have uprooted the college athletic industry and morphed it into a 
money making machine in which the student-athletes are denied basic rights (Staurowsky et. al., 
2015). Evidence of this ever growing commercialization can be noted in almost every facet of 
college sport, apparel and logo contracts, advertising of outside investor companies at arenas, to 
even the exploitation of a student’s image in video games (Benford, 2007). 
Arguably, the most apparent form of commercialization within college sport is the 
unceasing arms race between top level athletic facilities at different university programs. This 
highlights the disparity between the once student-led organization that was college athletics and 
the big business model that it is becoming. As institutions use each other as competitive 
benchmarks to build new facilities or renovate old ones there will remain a never ending chain of 
who has the biggest, best, and most up-to-date amenities for their teams and fans. Reformists 
have highlighted how this arms race focused on generating revenue to build new athletic 
infrastructure often causes increases in student fees that can therefore no longer be used to 
benefit the university’s academic programs (Sperber, 2000; Shulman & Bowen, 2001). 
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In addition to the physical arms races in regards to athletic facilities, there is an ever 
increasing market for coaching salaries. To highlight the dissonance between university focus on 
academics and athletes it is important to note the common occurrence of coaches receiving 
higher salaries than faculty and even in some cases the presidents and chancellors of big time 
universities (Benford, 2007). James Duderstadt (2000), the former president of the University of 
Michigan, exclaimed that among the community members of a university the coaches are the 
only ones who personally profit from the reputation and activities (Benford, 2007). In fact, 
between the 2006 and 2010 seasons average football coaching salaries continuously increased 
across all conferences (Humphreys, Soebbing, & Watanabe, 2011). Additionally, within that five 
year span, the average wage for a head football coach increased by over $363,000 dollars 
(Humphreys et al., 2011). 
While the commercialization of college athletics is often focused on building the newest 
facilities or paying coaches and administrators the highest wages, it is the case that the core sport 
product is being produced by unpaid student-athletes. From this, student-athletes not only serve 
the college sport industry but they also generate substantial revenue for other industries such as 
gambling, apparel, television, and tourism (Staurowsky et al., 2015; Marino, 2015). For example, 
the 2015 NCAA March Madness tournament generated over double the amount of money for the 
American Gambling Association than the National Football League Super bowl (Marino, 2015). 
These industries have a trickledown effect in which each one affects another one. The gambling 
bets placed on the March Madness tournament were substantial which in turn led to an increase 
in views, increasing the amount of advertising that was circulated by broadcasting companies, 
and thus an increase in sales and tourism surrounding the event (Staurowsky et al., 2015; Alesia, 
2015). While a large amount of athletic revenue generation has been highlighted within the 
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literature, it has primarily been focused on what the NCAA deems as revenue generating sports, 
such as football and basketball (Brown; 1993; Brown and Jewell, 2006). The exclusion of non-
revenue generating sports has left them out of the context of economic reform and therefore has 
allowed the NCAA to avoid initiating such reforms due to the proposed reforms inability to 
include all athletes. In consequence, this discourse has created a divide between revenue and 
non-revenue generating sports that needs to be addressed if there is to be any hope of a 
successful economic reform initiative in the NCAA. 
Additionally, this continued excessive commercialization of collegiate athletics has all 
together created a new industry in which many sports reformers refer to as the “edutainment” 
industry. The rampant growth of college sports within the entertainment industry has kept up to 
par barring technological advancements (Sperber, 1990). While this edutainment industry has 
brought substantial amounts of revenue to athletic programs across the country it has distorted 
the priorities of the governing leadership threatening the reputations of these academic 
institutions (Zimbalist, 1999; Benford, 2007). Duderstadt (2000) fears that these communities 
who were initially formed to serve and promote an academic culture have been neglected by 
administrations who favor intercollegiate athletics due to their revenue generation abilities as 
they continue to grow further and further towards the industry of big business. The fear that this 
blur of academic and athletic alliances will negatively impact the reputation of higher learning 
institutions is ever present (Benford, 2007). 
Amateurism as the Discursive Hurdle for Reform 
 Starting with the 1906 constitution of the NCAA, the national office defined the role of 
students in college sport by the declaration that student-athletes were amateur athletes 
(Freedman, 2002). This amateurism required that for student-athletes to be eligible for 
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competition within the association they must be pure of intent to play, and not have had received 
outside financial compensation for their athletic talents (Freedman, 2002). The NCAA bylaws 
state that student-athletes should be motivated by education and not exploited by professional or 
commercial enterprises (NCAA, 2012b). Therefore the challenge of college sport reform lies 
within the struggle to systematically deconstruct how college sport is no longer an amateur 
endeavor due to massive commercialization, and to address the budding need to determine 
universal implications of economic incentives for student-athletes.  
Moreover, upon the establishment of the one year athletic grant in aid (GIA) which was 
essentially a form of financial compensation awarded to student-athletes, there was concern that 
this financial compensation would infringe upon the NCAA’s principle of amateurism and 
players would be viewed as employees of the university (Staurowsky & Sack, 2005). In the wake 
of this concern the term student-athlete was coined as a way to highlight the amateurism of these 
athletes by not just merely calling them athletes (Byers, 1995). The term student-athlete itself is a 
form of selective language used to propagate the belief that these individuals are students first 
and athletes second, highlighting the claimed importance that the NCAA holds for higher 
education. This term was essential in swaying workers’ compensation boards and the general 
public that athletes who were receiving a GIA were no different than any other scholarship 
student (Staurowsky & Sack, 2005). 
The attempt to relate student-athletes to the general student population is theoretical at 
best. The existence of the NCAA itself creates a divide between student-athletes and other extra-
curricular involved students (Staurowsky, 2014a). There lacks a national governing body for the 
majority of scholarships received by students that would dictate the number or amount of 
scholarships that the student is able to obtain like the NCAA does with its scholarship recipients. 
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In accordance with that, there is a sheer lack of other extra-curricular participating students, 
outside of student-athletes, who have sought recognition as employees of the university in court 
(Staurowsky, 2014a). The trouble with attempting to compare student-athletes to other extra-
curricular students lies within the fact that other students do not generate revenue for the 
university and are merely part of the educational experience without having economic ties. 
Additionally, student-athletes do not have the freedom to transfer schools at their own will that 
other students are allowed (Staurowsky, 2014a), their property rights are owned and governed by 
their coaches who have the authority to initiate and allow school transfers.  If those arguments 
are not enough to clearly make a distinction between an average student and a student-athlete, 
facilities such as the $41.7 million John E. Jaqua Academic Center for Student Athletes 
(University of Oregon) will do the job. These student-athlete exclusive facilities are some of the 
facets that display how a clear, physical divide between students and student-athletes is in place.  
Precise language, such as the term student-athlete, has been used as a form of propaganda 
by the NCAA to control messages and broadcast the viewpoints that the NCAA national office 
deems as fostering and supportive of the Collegiate Model (Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). 
Myles Brand, the former NCAA President, repeatedly focused his State of the Association 
Addresses on the amateurism of student-athletes and how profit based models are what differ 
collegiate and professional athletics (Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). Brand (2004) claimed that 
members of the Collegiate model are merely students enrolled in academic programs whereas 
professional athletes, participants in the Professional Model, are members of a revenue 
generating labor force. However, past research on the MRP of college athletes has substantially 
supported the idea that student-athletes of certain sports, most obviously football and basketball, 
are key players in the revenue generating labor force of collegiate athletic programs which in 
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turn challenges the claim of amateurism that Brand was attempting to make with such statements 
(Brown, 1993; Brown & Jewell, 2006; Brand, 2004). 
The above arguments further nullify the claim that student-athletes are no different than 
any other scholarship student. It is through such selective language and propaganda that the 
Collegiate Model has created a discursive hurdle for the NCAA to have any chance at effective 
reform. The creation of this institutional hegemony and the draconian views of what defines a 
student-athlete make it difficult to conceptualize any sort of alternative to the current college-
sport logic (Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). By failing to identify these athletes as employees, it 
strips them of the rights to bargain collectively and propose salutary changes (Staurowsky et al., 
2015). 
College Sport Reform 
In 1883, concerns of professionalization, commercialism, and corruption sparked the first 
proposed reforms in NCAA history which were forwarded to 21 east coast institutions and only 
approved by two (Benford, 2007). Over the years faculty associations, private foundations, and 
sport organizations have formed in response to similar concerns. For example, in 1929, the 
Carnegie Foundation filed a reform report claiming that college football had significantly derived 
from the student’s game it once was to instead resemble a highly organized commercial 
enterprise (Benford, 2007). However, despite the continuous cycle of reform activity and 
extensive reports, there has been a significant lack of effective change within the governance of 
the NCAA (Benford, 2007). The current state of the NCAA can be blamed on the robust 
commercialization and current political economy of college sport (Sack & Staurowsky, 1998; 
Zimbalist, 1999). Arguably, the issues of failed college sport reform, which have been used to 
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address the state of the NCAA, will be resolved when college athletes are recognized for their 
labor and are compensated appropriately (Staurowsky et al., 2015). 
 One important focus of college sport reform needs to lie within the meaningful change of 
business practices that currently govern the NCAA through targeting efforts to give basic rights 
to college athletes. Such changes would include the identification of student-athletes as revenue 
generating employees of the university and therefore lead to their adequate compensation for 
such a position, access to a fair and legitimate education experience, and ultimately to receive the 
respect and recognition from the NCAA that they have earned by being awarded such rights 
(Staurowsky et al., 2015). The difficulty with initiating these fundamental economic changes, 
commonly referred to as pay for play, lies within the amateuristic identification of student-
athletes. For such a change to occur, a conceptual breakthrough regarding the athletes’ identities 
as employees of the university would be necessary. Without the recognition of the association 
between athlete labor status and the actual economic disruption of the inequality of pay in 
athletics the distribution of revenue will remain the same and therefore future reform efforts will 
be nonexistent. While athletes themselves are considered amateurs, there is nothing amateur 
about the big time collegiate athletic programs for which they generate revenue (Buzuvis, 2015). 
 Since the 1930s, football and basketball players have challenged their institutions to 
recognize their status as employees of the university through the provision of fair compensation 
and recognition for their work (Staurowsky, 2015). Recently, in 2014, Northwestern University 
football players attempted to unionize by authorizing the College Athletes Players Association to 
represent them as players in collective bargaining with university administration (Staurowsky, 
2014b). The movement was initially awarded a momentous decision when a regional-level 
member of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled in favor of the players and agreed 
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that they were being treated as employees (Buzuvis, 2015). The director fundamentally focused 
on the compensation aspect when organizing the analysis of his decision and centered his ruling 
on the common law definition of an employee, which is a person who performs services for 
another while subject to their control and in return for payment. To the players’ dismay, 
Northwestern University appealed the decision in federal court and the NLRB ultimately ruled 
against the players and therefore in favor of the university (Buzuvis, 2015).  
Additionally, players from varying universities have banned together to initiate change 
within the context of college sport. The All Players United movement began with less than two 
dozen football players from three universities who were searching for a way to support fellow 
student-athletes. The athletes they were supporting, had agreed to be plaintiffs in two different 
lawsuits against the NCAA regarding the lack of player compensation and failure to protect the 
health of student-athletes by withholding information regarding concussions (Staurowsky, 
2014b). These players offered their support through handwriting the letters “APU” on their 
wristbands, symbolic for the term All Players United. While the movement was barely 
discernible and widely unknown to the general public, even to fellow players and coaches, the 
attention brought about by the media revealed the depths to which student athletes are 
manipulated and exploited by university administrations (Staurowsky, 2014b). The ESPN 
broadcast Outside the Lines spoke with Ramogi Huma, the National College Players Association 
(NCPA) president, who admitted that the APU gesture was months in the making. Huma 
discussed how the players have strategically used their visibility on national television and 
popularity on social media outlets to draw attention to their movement (Farrey, 2013). 
Outside of player initiated movements, groups such as the Knight Commission of 
Intercollegiate Athletics and the College Athletes Rights and Empowerment Faculty Coalition 
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(CARE-FC) have formed to combat unjust regulations made against student athletes. The Knight 
Commission has publically called for the NCAA to establish new guidelines that distribute 
revenue generated from the March Madness tournament to better support athlete education and 
health (Perko, 2016). The current guidelines limit the amount of tournament revenue dedicated to 
athlete education and health to a mere twenty-five percent. The Knight Commission continues to 
persuade the NCAA to reward academic outcomes as well as athletic ones. The commission has 
chastised the NCAA for their lack of policy change over the last quarter century given the 
significant increase in athletic revenue. 
 Overall, most large-scale athletic movements have received national recognition due to 
the popularity surrounding football and men’s basketball which are considered revenue 
generating sport. It is commonly argued that non-revenue generating sport rely on the profits 
made by revenue generating sport to function, and therefore are conceptually viewed as burdens 
to pay-for-play. In contrary, non-revenue sport arguably offer value to the university given their 
availability for participation, publicity opportunities, enhanced alumni relations, and Title IX 
compliance (Staurowsky et al., 2015). In the context of sport, Title IX requires that an institution 
receiving federal funds must provide proportionately equal opportunities to all genders. In the 
context of athletics, this includes equivalent access to: facilities, equipment, coaching staff, 
academic services, and so forth. However, those drafting the regulation realized that this 
interpretation of the law would produce nothing but hypothetical equality therefore it was altered 
via a regulatory provision that governs athletics since the athletic departments do not directly 
receive federal aid (Staurowsky et al., 2015). This regulatory provision required that athletic 
departments must demonstrate gender equality in which outcomes rather than opportunities are 
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equalized through the number of opportunities in sport provided to each sex, the overall quality 
of the programs, and the compatibility of scholarship dollars awarded to athletes of each sex. 
Furthermore, this interpretation of Title IX in the context of athletics depends on an 
institution meeting one of three standards set out by the Department of Education (Buzuvis, 
2015). That is, in order to be considered compliant in regards to Title IX, an athletic department 
must either show: proportionate opportunities and resources for each gender based on 
institutional characteristics, a history of program expansion to provide opportunities for 
underrepresented genders, or that the interests and abilities of the underrepresented gender is 
fully accommodated (Staurowsky et al., 2015). In this manner, institutions can remain Title IX 
compliant by slowly expanding opportunities for female student-athletes, rather than attempting 
to provide equal resources for both genders. 
In turn, Title IX creates a perceived legal roadblock to pay-for-play, due to the fact that 
all female sport are considered non-revenue generating. If pay-for-play were to be initiated the 
general perception is that female athletes would need to be compensated equitably in relation to 
their male counterparts, without this the university would not be Title IX compliant (Staurowsky 
et al., 2015). The NCAA argues that paying athletes in revenue sport coupled with the 
commensurate obligation under Title IX to pay females athletes would be prohibitively 
expensive for college athletics (Buzuvis, 2015). This roadblock has brought the pursuit to 
address pay-for-play in the NCAA to a halt. 
Instead of true pay-for-play, the NCAA has allowed schools to modify their definition of 
cost-of-attendance. This change was brought forth due to the outcome of the O’Bannon vs. the 
NCAA case in which the court ruled that student-athletes could receive increased payments 
towards covering the cost of attendance. Courts typically require market-based evidence for a 
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procompetitive justification. However, to date, no such evidence exists supporting the idea that 
consumer interest in NCAA sport is dependent upon the player’s classification as amateurs. 
Furthermore, sports such as tennis, rugby, and the Olympics were used as justification that 
consumer demand was not impacted by changing the status of athletes from amateurs to 
professionals (O’Bannon vs. NCAA, 2015). Nevertheless, the Court ruled that this evidence was 
not sufficient in the case of the NCAA, as college sport represented an entirely different product. 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit Court believed that payment to athletes that was untethered 
to education would cause consumers to lose interest in the sport (O’Bannon vs. NCAA, 2015). 
Such discrepancy highlights the importance that courts need to place on empirically-produced 
research as opposed to assumptions when it comes to determining the procompetitive value of 
amateurism. Blatantly, procompetitive justification for the NCAA’s rules that restrict student-
athlete compensation should not persist out of blind imitation of the past (O’Bannon vs. NCAA, 
2015). 
Recently, Gabe Feldman made a proposal that would redefine the term amateur through 
the rights of players to to use their names, images, or likeness (NIL) for financial gain. The 
Knight Commission has agreed to explore such NIL endorsement opportunities but admits that 
there are many stipulations that would need to be addressed, such as the fact that such a change 
would most likely generate major enforcement challenges that would need to be thought through 
and addressed before implementation (Perko, 2016). The commission has also recognized that 
such an endorsement deal would only affect a small percentage of college athletes, most likely 
those in high revenue generating sport. 
However, this paper argues that the question of athlete compensation needs to be 
revisited due to the many factors in the equation that are merely taken for granted such as non-
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revenue sport relying on revenue sport income without the necessary empirical evidence to make 
such a claim. From this, the current study attempts to advance the literature by considering how 
revenues and expenses are determined for a non-revenue sport. Specifically, this paper will focus 
on NCAA Division-I Swimming due to the existence of elite level Olympic swimmers, as well as 
both female and male teams. This will be accomplished through empirically examining what 
factors are important in determining the revenue and expenses for NCAA swimming programs. 
 The extensive history of reform and the sheer number of organizational actors within it 
make it particularly complicated for reform-minded citizens and analysts alike to agree upon 
meaningful reform initiatives (Staurowsky et al., 2015). Thus, in order to consider the 
determinants of revenues and expenses for college athletes, there is need to first consider the 
economic literature on pay and performance in professional sport. In the following, the research 
on economics within professional sport is analyzed, with special focus on the guidance that it can 
provide for future research on college athletics. 
Pay and Performance Theory 
While the arguments supporting the idea that student-athletes are a complete entity of 
their own and deserve some sort of financial recourse outside of a GIA for the contributions they 
make to the university's revenue generation, the challenge lies within how such a program would 
be facilitated (Staurowsky, 2014b; Staurowsky & Sack, 2005). To best model how performance 
based compensation may work in the NCAA it is important to look back upon the history of pay 
and performance in professional leagues. The labor market of professional sports has 
experienced a plethora of rule and regulation adjustments throughout the years, similar to the 
reforms seen in the NCAA. These changes, along with outside factors, have affected the 
dispersion of talent and labor across many sport leagues. Baseball in particular has been the 
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primary context for many early studies that examine this dispersion of labor due to the excess of 
data available to researchers regarding the productivity and salaries of individual players (Scully, 
1974). 
Rottenberg’s (1956) seminal work is seen as the cornerstone for sports economists due to 
his numerous contributions to developing a theoretical understanding of the economics of 
professional sport teams and leagues (Fort, 2005). Among his many contributions, one that 
stands out is the development of the invariance principle (IP), which has helped to predict the 
effect of free agency on the labor market and overall competitive balance in professional 
baseball. Notably, Rottenberg (1956) highlights the idea that the revenue generated from the 
property rights of a player will not be affected by the distribution of talent within a league. That 
is, in sport, the owners of a property right usually have the intent to increase their revenue 
generation and produce positive league outcomes. Therefore, both players and owners as 
property right holders will make decisions that optimize their revenue generation potential 
(Rottenberg, 1956; Fort, 2005). 
Moreover, there is also risk involved when investing in talent, in the sense that players 
are like oil wells (Rottenberg, 1956). That is, sometimes the player becomes a productive 
member of the team and fulfills the overall investment, whereas other times the player is a dry 
well and falls short of expectations. Thus, this theorization of the risk that comes from investing 
in human capital in professional sport can help to explain the difference in MRP and player 
compensation in collegiate sport (Fort, 2005). 
It is also worth noting that Rottenberg does not believe that the allowance of player 
negotiation and potential increases in compensation will lead to a bidding war between the large 
monopsonistic league powers in attempt to attain the highest quality of talent. To support this 
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belief, Rottenberg uses the reserve clause in professional baseball, which has been shown that 
with or without the clause player talent is worth the same amount and therefore the monetary 
amount of investment should not change (Rottenberg, 1956; Fort, 2005). Rottenberg believes 
that things such as roster limits, revenue sharing, and individual player salary caps are more 
likely than potential varying player compensation offers to cause the allocation of league talent 
to change (Fort, 2005).  
Despite Rottenberg’s (1956) support of free agency, the reserve clause maintained status 
quo in professional baseball due to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1922 that held professional 
baseball exempt from federal antitrust statutes because Major League Baseball did not have a 
constitutionally defined article of commerce. For years the government had been attempting to 
pass a comprehensive bill that would hold all four major professional sports associations to the 
same antitrust statutes. At the time, teams had the ability to implement reserve clauses which 
bound athletes to a given team until the contracts terminated or the players were sold to another 
team. Furthermore, leagues also had control over their own territorial rights which gave them the 
right to organize a team within a certain radius of their home field. Thus partnerships between 
leagues and broadcasting networks, that were exempt from antitrust laws, benefitted the leagues 
by allowing them to reap the proceeds of said contracts. The teams argued that these antitrust 
exemptions were necessary for them to maintain public honesty and to equalize player strengths 
amongst the teams. It was argued that due to articles such as the reserve clause the sport of 
baseball was truly kept alive by equally spreading athletic competition amongst teams as 
opposed to it becoming an economic competition between which teams can pay the most for the 
most talented athletes (El-Hodiri and Quirk, 1971). 
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However, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) determined that even with the reserve clause and 
draft system acting as restraints on an economic based market the rules permitting player 
contract sales lead to a disruption of competitive balance due to the differentiation of economic 
revenue generating potential between the cities in the league. Although, if teams were to prohibit 
the sale of player contracts and over time equal out player strengths they would violate antitrust 
laws due to the necessity of all teams in the league needing to participate in joint action. By 
decentralizing the control of the teams, possibly through free agency, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) 
believed that player strengths between teams would equalize and therefore maximize overall 
league profit. 
Fort and Quirk (1995) decided to analyze how various changes in the economic structure 
of the MLB such as, free agency, salary caps, the rookie draft, and television revenue sharing 
could have on profit maximization both at the team and player level as well as the overall market 
equilibrium. In regards to free agency, they used the win-percent model to highlight how the 
change from a reserve clause system to free agency would not have an effect on overall win 
distribution throughout the league. A downfall of the switch to free agency would be the 
decrease of subsidies attained by weak-drawing teams when they sell talent. These subsidies may 
have helped to increase the weak-drawing teams’ chances of survival. However, Fort and Quirk 
reported that no MLB teams went out of business given the switch to free agency and the drop of 
subsidies for weaker-drawing teams.  
Salary caps have also been investigated as a way to control competitive balance amongst 
sport leagues (Fort and Quirk, 1995). Fort and Quirk compared the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) win percentages and league championships pre and post salary cap initiation. 
The win-percent model did not report a significant change in win percentage after the salary cap 
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had been active for nine years. Adversely, the inequality of the distribution of championships 
increased almost eleven percent after the introduction of the salary cap. By just looking at these 
results it could be argued that salary caps fail to promote competitive balance and cause a 
skewed distribution of championships amongst teams. However, it is important to investigate 
these claims further to get a better understanding of the true cause of failure in the professional 
league salary cap system in the hopes to initiate an improved system in NCAA sport. 
Fort and Quirk (1995) believed that the failure of this salary cap theory, for the NBA, was 
largely due to it’s inability to actually control and equalize the spending on talent amongst teams. 
Grandfather clauses were in place in the early stage of the salary cap which exempted the 
highest-salary teams from complying. This made it impossible for other teams to match those 
salaries and restricted their abilities to be competitive options for the top players and actually 
caused a negative effect on competitive balance. These strong-drawing teams were highly 
incentivized to violate the salary cap policies to acquire higher profit for their team. A true 
portrayal of the effect of salary caps on competitive balance will not be possible in the NBA until 
the distortion of the data caused by this grandfathering has alleviated. 
Ultimately, it is through these reforms within professional sport that we can begin to 
formulate a sense of the implications that would accompany the introduction of performance 
based compensation in collegiate athletics. Salary caps, team revenue potential, and the transfer 
of property rights from coaches to players were all shown to not have a significant effect on the 
competitive balance of the professional leagues (Fort and Quirk, 1995; Rottenberg, 1956; Coase, 
1960). By seeing how such implications have affected professional sport leagues, NCAA 




Considering the above literature, there has been a sufficient lack of empirical 
examination into the monetary value of collegiate athletes. In response to this lack of empirical 
evidence, Brown (1993) attempted to estimate the marginal revenue product generated by 
premium college football players through a regression function of their team’s skill level, quality 
of opponent, and various market characteristics. He then compared this revenue to the maximum 
payments allocated by the NCAA to determine how much rent players generated for their 
university. Specifically, he regressed the 1998 team revenues on the number of players that were 
drafted into the professional league, holding constant the team’s market potential and opponent’s 
skill levels using a two-stage least squares regression model. 
While Brown’s contributions have greatly broadened the scope of collegiate sport 
economic literature, they have focused primarily on revenue generating sport, leaving non-
revenue sport out of the conversation. From this, the purpose of the current proposed research is 
to broaden the understanding of the financial workings of non-revenue sport within the NCAA. 
Specifically, the current study attempts to make significant contribution to the literature by 
examining the revenue and expenses for Division I NCAA swim programs over a seven year 
time span. Furthermore, this research has important implications for the management of college 















To begin with, this study utilizes an econometric approach to investigate the finances of 
NCAA Division I swim programs. As prior noted, this study considers swimming programs as 
they are non-revenue sports that have both male and female teams, and most often share coaches 
and facilities. Along these lines, a revenue function was developed to model the factors which 
are important in determining revenue for NCAA swim programs. This function was then 
analyzed by running a multiple regression analysis to produce results. The proposed function 
takes the form of: 
Revenue = f(Pit,Mit,Ait) 
In this, the equation suggests that revenue is a function of team performance (P), the local 
market characteristics (M), as well as characteristics of the athletic department (A) which 
sponsors the program. 
Model Specification 
In order to estimate a full model, the variables used to represent the characteristics within 
the revenue function were defined, the variables can be found in Table 1. First, beginning with 
the dependent variables, both revenues and expenses were collected for all NCAA Division-I 
swim programs. This financial data was collected from the Equity in Athletics Database 
(EADA), an online website which hosts athletic department financial data as part of their 
compliance with The Higher Education Amendment Act of 1992. As, the data is used as part of 
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the Title IX reporting system, the revenues and expenses are separated out for both men’s and 
women’s swim programs, allowing for models to be estimated for each gender. 
 Next, considering the independent variables, the performance of teams is measured using 
the total number of points (Points) a team earned in the NCAA Swimming Championships. 
While previous studies which have examined determinants of revenue for sport teams have 
widely utilized team performance in their estimations, this is most commonly done by 
calculating the percentage of games a team wins (Brown 1993; 1994). However, due to the 
complex nature of NCAA swimming which combines time trials, qualifiers, dual/tri/quad meets, 
conference and NCAA championships, win percent is not a reliable measure of determining the 
quality and performance of swim programs. Furthermore, as swim competitions are 
individualistic in nature, and often have swimmers from the same team competing against one 
another, the potential to earn the maximum number of points in a competition is limited. 
 Thus, from all of this, the present research utilizes the variable Points, as it provides a 
more valid measure of team performance when competing against the best teams within college 
swimming. Specifically, in the NCAA championships, only the top 16 swimmers in each event 
can earn points for their team, with the team’s dual meet record from the season having no 
bearing on their standing in the NCAA championship meet. Thus, the Points variable takes the 
form of the team’s composite score which will be calculated by allocating points based of off 
final standings in each specific event. In addition to points, the strength of conference opponents 
(OpponentsPoints) was also included to control for the strength of teams which a swim team will 
most often compete against. In order to calculate the number of points earned by opponents at 
the NCAA Championships, the total conference scores were summed together, and then the 
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scores for each school were subtracted to develop a measure which reflects only the other teams 
they competed against. 
Moving to the market variables, the research has theorized the importance of regional and 
state-level characteristics in determining the interest that fans may show in a program. Since a 
team’s ability to attract spectators, and therefore revenue, has been shown to be a decreasing 
function of distance, Metropolitan Statistical Area population (MSAPop) and total state 
population (StatePop) are included as controls as is done in prior studies (Brown, 1994). MSA 
and state population data was gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data site, 
with the MSA areas being defined as areas that are larger than cities, which often encompass 
several counties and are considered to be a better definition of the true size of a local sport teams 
market (Brown, 1993; 1994). Also, due to the fact that a few schools within the dataset have a 
small local area populations (e.g., Lewisburg, PA), both micro and metropolitan area data were 
collected via the BEA site to control for market population. 
Last, considering athletic department specific controls, the number of the total number of 
participants (Participants) and total number of swimmers (Olympians) who competed in the 
2010 and 2016 Summer Olympic Games were gathered. The number of participants is provided 
by the EADA database, while the Olympic swimmers were gathered by going through the list of 
Olympic athletes that is published on the NCAA website. In this manner, this study is able to 
control both for the number of total individuals who are on a team, as well as the presence of any 
elite level Olympic swimmers. In previous studies, the number in which a player was drafted into 
the professional league has been used a measure of eliteness (Brown, 1993; Brown and Jewell, 
2004). Therefore, in this study, Olympic competitor status is used as a determinant for 
professional level of competition within the context swimming. Finally, the revenues of the 
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football and basketball programs at each University were gathered from the EADA site to control 
for the revenue generation capability of each school. 
 
Table 1 Variable Description 
Variable Description 
BasketballRevM Total revenue generated by men’s basketball at the team’s institution 
ChampPointM Number of points earned by male teams in the NCAA Championships 
ChampPointW Number of points earned by female teams in the NCAA Championships 
EFTotalCount Total number of participants who compete for the team 
FootballRev Total revenue generated by football at the team’s institution 
MSAPop Total state population for the state the team’s University is located in 
Olympians Total number of Olympians who compete for the team 
OppPointM Number of points earned by other male teams in the NCAA Championships 
OppPointW 
Number of points earned by other female teams in the NCAA 
Championships 
StatePop Total population of the metro/micro area that the team is located in 
yele State population in 2011 
yfive State population in 2015 
yfour State population in 2014 
ysix State population in 2016 
ythir State population in 2013 
ytwl State population in 2012 
Note. NCAA = National Collegiate Athletic Association 
 
From this, these variables allow for the examination of the relationship between the 
popular belief that non-revenue generating sport, such as swimming, rely on revenue generated 
from football and basketball. These variables will then be used to form the following equation 
which is estimated using regression analysis: 
Revenue = f(MSAPop, StatePop, Olympians, EFTotalCount, BasketballRevM, 
FootballRev, yele, ytwl, ythir, yfour, yfiv, ysix, ChampPoint, OppPoint) 
Estimation of Data 
In order to estimate the factors that are important in determining revenue for NCAA 
swimming, there is first need to consider the nature of the data and methods of estimation. To 
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begin with, the data were composed of repeated observations of the same schools over time. 
Thus, this data must be treated as a panel data set, which requires adjustments and corrections to 
the regressions such as using a panel estimator. 
 Next, in order to estimate results from the panel data set, the STATA statistical software 
were utilized to estimate several regression models. Considering the panel nature of the data, the 
regressions were estimated with both fixed and random effects. Following this, a Hausman test 
was conducted to estimate whether there were statistical differences between the coefficients of 
the fixed and random effects models. Initial results from the Hausman pilot test suggested that a 
GLS regression with fixed effects was suitable to estimate the final results for all intended 
models. From this, four models were estimated, two models examine revenue, one for men and 
one model for women, as well as another two models to estimate total expenses, one for men and 
one for women. 
Another reason that the use of GLS was used instead of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression is due to the potential lack of efficiency. Furthermore, the use of GLS is also better 
suited to this study, as there are several variables which are time-invariant and thus present 
estimation issues for OLS regressions using fixed effects. Specifically, having variables that do 
change in observation for each panel during a dataset would cause them to be omitted from an 
OLS regression preventing their use as controls. Thus, a GLS regression with fixed effects 










 Table 2 and Table 3 represent the models examining total team expenses for male and 
female teams respectively. The R2 values given for the expense models range from 0.114 to 
0.182, indicating that the models explain about 11% to 18% of the variation in the data. For the 
revenue models, Table 4 which represents the male teams and Table 5 which represents the 
female teams, the R2 values are between 0.006 and 0.204, indicating that the models account for 
less than 1% to 20% of the variation in the sample. The differences in the R2 values between may 
be due to the fact that the models are not congruent, that is two of models use revenue data while 
the other two use expense data. After the addition of football and basketball revenues to the 
models the R2 values increase. This increase indicates that the data fit the model better which 
shows that the addition of these variables helps to better predict the expenses and revenues for 
swim teams. However, the R2 values across all models are still relatively low, possibly as a 
























Note. SE = standard error. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
The revenue models estimate similar increases for MSAPop, for every one increase in the 
metropolitan statistical area, revenue generation for both men’s and women’s teams are expected 
to decrease. The findings in Table 5 conflict with previous studies that have shown significant 
effects of metropolitan statistical area (MSA) on women’s basketball revenue (Brown & Jewell, 
2006). The lack of MSA significance for women’s team revenue in the current study could be 
due to a lack of general market potential for women’s swimming compared to women’s 
basketball. Following previous research, MSA is used in conjunction with state population to 
compose a rounded picture of the team’s potential market (Brown & Jewell, 2006). In this study 
state population follows a similar trend across all four models, on average the StatePop results 
for male and female teams are miniscule and not significant.  
After establishing a cohort of variables that help to create an estimate of the market 
potential for a team, the need to establish the talent and competitive stature of a team arose. The 
Variable Coefficient SE 
MSAPop -0.274 .1317** 
StatePop 0.0387 0.0363 
Olympians 5,143 5,576 
EFTotalCount -8.288 8.838 
BasketballRevM 0.0169 .0053*** 
FootballRev 0.0052 .0017*** 
year_2011 27,654 26,097 
year_2012 64,409 27,201*** 
year_2013 74,561 28,790*** 
year_2014 102,359 30,209*** 
year_2015 84,285 32,840*** 
year_2016 108,056 36,168*** 
ChampPointM 359.14 191.78** 
OppPointM 170.01 39.66*** 
_cons 406,908 301,218 
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first variable that is used as a way to measure a team’s elite talent is Olympians, which accounts 
for the number of Olympic participants on each team. It was found that having swimmers who 
competed in the Olympic Games did not have a significant impact on team revenues. Such 
finding conflicts with previous studies which have shown that elite level talent has a positive 
significant effect on revenue for both male and female teams (Brown, 1993; Brown and Jewell, 
2006). In the expense model, Table 3, the variable of Olympians is negative and significant. 
Considering the coefficient, for every additional female Olympian a team is expected to have a 
$8,966.62 decrease in expenses. This finding is surprising since one would think that Olympians 
drive expenses in the form of building high level training facilities or employing well paid top 
level coaches to attract Olympic level athletes. Specialization is the hiring of full-time coaches 
for both a female and male team of the same sport. This is believed to occur at institutions 
looking to become more competitive or seek national recognition and in turn is expected to drive 
up annual operating expenses (Thelin, 2015). However this may not be the case when it comes to 
institutions that attract Olympic level talent, such as the University of Michigan. In which their 
male and female teams are both coached by Mike Bottom, allowing the female Olympians to 
train with the same coach as the males, thus a decrease in operating expenses. Ultimately, it 
seems that Olympians are unexpectedly going to schools that spend less.  An explanation of this 
finding could be that the institutions attracting Olympic talent already have top-level staff and 
infrastructure in place and therefore are not actively spending money on establishing them. 
Unlike their female counterparts, the men’s expense model was positive but not significant, 
indicating that there is an increase in expense per each additional male Olympian. This finding 
could indicate that at institutions where the teams have the same coach, the salary is actually 
being placed on the men’s teams operating expenses as opposed to the females. 
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 To further contribute to factors that may influence team stature, competitive potential, 
and market potential EFTotalCount, or number of athletes on a team, was added as a variable. 
However EFTotalCount fails to prevail as a contributing factor to team revenue and expenditures 
by being found insignificant in all models. One could argue that for a given sport industry to 
survive the competitive talent within that industry must be of approximately equal (Rottenberg, 
1956). As such, the invariance principle states that revenue generation from players will not be 
affected by the distribution of talent within a division. Thus one would not expect to see a 
significant effect of team size on expense or revenues (Rottenberg, 1956). Athletes may or may 
not fulfill the overall investment that was spent on them, causing a risk that could negatively 
affect team revenues. Therefore the talent within the league should be dispersed equally so that 
teams make up investments that were lost on revenue lacking athletes with high revenue 
generating teammates. El-Hodiri and Quirk believe that true athletic competition is kept alive 
through the equal dispersion of players and talent throughout a division as opposed to it 
becoming an economic expense race between teams (1971). The competitive balance of a league 
may lead to generalized team symmetry amongst the league and therefore lack of significance of 




Table 3 Women’s Team Expense Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient SE 
MSAPop -0.1379 0.1316 
StatePop 0.0308 0.0347 
Olympians -8966.62 5392.71* 
EFTotalCount 6.81 8.455 
BasketballRevM 0.0119 0.0051** 
FootballRev 0.0049 0.0016*** 
year_2011 49731 2534* 
year_2012 98358 26440*** 
year_2013 125619 27924*** 
year_2014 162581 29296*** 
year_2015 177597 31869*** 
year_2016 274433 35011*** 
ChampPointW 220.48 216.92 
OppPointW 19.64 40.38 
_cons 384703.7 289603.8 
Note. SE = standard error. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
Given that swimming is considered a non-revenue generating sport, it allowed for an 
opportunity to see the effects that high revenue generating sport, which has been extensively 
studied in the previous MRP research, may have on a less procuring sport (Brown; 1993; Brown 
& Jewell 2006). Thus the variables measuring football and men’s basketball revenue were 
factored into the equation. Across all four models, football and men’s basketball revenue 
variables are significant. In the expense models, results indicate that as football and basketball 
revenue increase swim programs are estimated to spend more, possibly showing that more 
revenue from the larger sports is being allocated to other teams for expenses. In the revenue 
models, Tables 4 and 5, FootballRev and BasketballRevM are negative and significant which 
indicates that as football and men’s basketball revenue increase by $1.00 swimming revenue is 
expected to decrease by about $0.01. The potential reasoning here could be that fans are being 
drawn to attend football and basketball games over swim meets, thus revenue is being generated 
 35 
 
by those programs instead. The expense models are both positive and significant. Tables 2 and 3 
show that for every dollar increase in basketball revenue men’s and women’s expenses are 
expected to increase by $0.01 to $0.02.  Whereas football revenue is expected to increase 
revenue only by about a half of a cent. This could highlight the idea that income from the large 
revenue-generating programs of football and basketball are being allocated to swim programs to 
help cover expenses. Taken together, this impact supports previous literature showing that 
football and basketball programs contribute large rents to their universities (Brown, 2011; 
Brown, 1993). 
All four models indicate results of the yearly population increases, 2011 through 2016, as 
being significant and positive. These variables were added in to show the overall trend of 
revenues and expenses across the years in this study. This could indicate that as the market 
potential for swimming grows so do operating expenses and revenues. 
 
Table 4 Men’s Team Revenue Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient SE 
MSAPop -0.1193 0.1446 
StatePop 0.021 0.0383 
Olympians 1,286 5,882 
EFTotalCount -2.436 9.321 
BasketballRevM -0.0144 0.0056* 
FootballRev -0.0074 0.0017*** 
year_2011 24,511 27,526 
year_2012 92,668 28690*** 
year_2013 157,638 30366*** 
year_2014 175,102 31863*** 
year_2015 175,022 34638*** 
year_2016 226,503 38148*** 
ChampPointM 641.89 202.28*** 
OppPointM 126.56 41.83*** 
_cons 428,794 317,708 
Note. SE = standard error. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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The ChampPointM variable is positive and significant in Table 4. As estimated, if there is 
a one point increase in points scored at the men’s NCAA Division I Championships, teams are 
expected to generate an increase of about $641.89 in revenue. This could tie into the market 
potential point made above, that the more popular or competitive a sport is the more attention in 
the market it draws therefore leading to increases in revenue. Teams are gaining money from 
possible ticket or merchandise sales the more competitive their division is. On the contrary, the 
ChampPointW variable in Table 5 is negative and not significant. This represents a loss in 
revenue per each increase in points scored at the Women’s NCAA Division I Championship. The 
coefficient on ChampPointM for the men’s expense model is found to be positive and 
significant. This  could represent the idea that teams are investing in making themselves 
competitive, therefore their expenses are increasing the more points they earn, Expenses on more 
successful teams could be due to higher coach salary since one would expect the most productive 
coaches to be found in the highest level of competition where salaries are the highest (Brown, 
2011). The coefficient on the women’s expense model is also positive but not found to be 
significant, reporting an increase. Points were used as a measure of overall team performance as 
opposed to win percentage due to the better ability of the point measure to fully capture 




Table 5 Women’s Team Revenue Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient SE 
MSAPop -0.0098 0.1799 
StatePop 0.0286 0.0475 
Olympians 437.93 7372.44 
EFTotalCount 6.575 11.56 
BasketballRevM -0.0127 0.007* 
FootballRev -0.0071 0.0022*** 
year_2011 45765 34645 
year_2012 144268 36147*** 
year_2013 185486 38176*** 
year_2014 195040 40052*** 
year_2015 243914 43569*** 
year_2016 294830 47864*** 
ChampPointW -481.55 296.55 
OppPointW 109.56 55.19** 
_cons 218565.6 395920 
Note. SE = standard error. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
Another measure of the level of competition within a division is the opponent point 
variable which measures how many points a team’s opponents scored during the championships. 
Both the men’s and women’s revenue models indicated that the opponent point variables were 
significant and positive. In Table 4, men’s revenue is expected to increase by $126.56 for every 
one increase in opponent point. Similarly, women’s revenue is expected to increase by $109.56 
for every opponent point earned. This could should that as divisions become more competitive 
there is an increase in revenue generation, similar to the statement made about championship 
points above. The significance of the OppPointM variable in Table 2 indicates that for every one 
point increase in an opponent’s score a team is expected to spend $170.01 more on their team. A 
competitive division could lead teams to spend more money on top-level training or high quality 
suits. Additionally it may highlight the idea that teams are spending money to win, possibly in 
the form of recruiting techniques, facilities, and coaching staff. The stronger the conference 
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competition is the more money a program spends. These data are similar to the marginal revenue 
product of men’s football player research conducted by Brown (2011). In which, Top-25 Point 
Rankings, which measure the performance of a team in comparison to their conference 
opponents, was found to be a significant factor in football revenue generation. The coefficient of 










 As the discussion of the potential for performance based compensation for student 
athletes grows, the need for more extensive literature on the monetary effects that student 
athletes have on their institutions will become ever-present. The pay for play conversation will 
always be limited until the scope of the literature is broadened to include more than just revenue 
generating sports. Thus this research intends to expand the MRP literature by contributing an 
estimate of a non-revenue generating sport to the conversation of a player’s economic worth. 
 Specifically the results indicate a few key findings and mixed results that could help to 
spark future research or conversation. First, all four regression results indicate that both football 
and men’s basketball are significant variables in the revenue and expenditures of Division I swim 
programs. This would lead one to believe that athletic departments in general may highly rely on 
the success of their large revenue generating sports to determine the budgeting procedures for 
other less revenue heavy teams. It would be intuitive to think that the revenue produced by 
football or basketball is being shared amongst the athletic department as a whole to aid other 
sports in their survival and potential for increased revenue generation (Brown, 2011; Brown, 
1993). In other words, the findings suggest that NCAA programs may not be determining how 
they allocate expenses based on program specific needs and competition but rather are 
determining how much is allocated to a program based on their football, basketball, and overall 
revenue generation capability. 
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 Additionally the variable of Olympians has a significant effect in the women’s expense 
regression. Contrary to initial thoughts on this variable, the effect of having an Olympian on a 
women’s team created a decrease of almost $9,000 in expenses. This would indicate that for 
women’s teams Olympians do not drive expenses, but in turn are attending schools that spend 
less money. Such a finding could affect future recruiting practices. 
 Despite the NCAA’s argument that paying athletes in revenue generating sports coupled 
with the commensurate obligation under Title IX to pay female athletes would be prohibitively 
expensive for athletic departments, this study found that there was no significant effect of 
participant counts on team expenses (Buzuvis, 2015). This presents the argument that participant 
numbers are not a significant factor in determining swim team expenses and therefore would not 
be expected exceed the expense capability of the athletic departments. Thus, if pay for play were 
to be initiated, the equality of outcome in paying for both male and female participants cannot be 
argued as a significant factor on expenses.  
Another thing to take into consideration when examining this study is the relationship 
between revenues and expenses. This relationship can be explained by the revenue theory of cost 
in which it is theorized that the expenses of an institution are determined by the revenues it 
generates (Bowen, 1980). Due to many universities non-profit status, they will spend the revenue 
that they generate to break even. This in turn creates a positive correlation between revenue and 
expenditures. Thus in the NCAA data used in this study there may not be a large difference 
between revenue and expenses since the institutions in this study fall into this revenue-to-cost 
spiral which leads their revenues grow in line with their expenses. 
As the college athletic industry continues to grow economically, the duality of student 
athlete’s roles at their universities will persist to fragment in two, their label as amateurs yet their 
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contribution as laborers. Under the shield of amateurism, these athletes lack the fundamental 
rights that would accompany the acknowledgement of their labor contribution to the economic 
growth of their institutions (Staurowsky et. al, 2015). The argument that paying student athletes 
would unhinge college sport at its core and result in fans to disengage has not been supported by 
empirical evidence, thus the importance of broadening the literature surrounding college athletic 
revenues and expenses is ever present (Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). Institutionally, the NCAA 
holds power through its monosporic nature and spontaneous consent among members who are 
often cornered into the inability to conceptualize an alternative to the current college-sport logic 
(Huma & Staurowsky, 2011). The reliance upon the Collegiate Model of Athletics has led the 
NCAA administration to propagate a disillusioned state of order and equality within college 
sport economics (Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). 
 When discussing this study’s contribution to the existing literature it is important to note 
how it provides a new model of athletic economic variables that helps to create a more 
comprehensive understanding of the existing MRP research. A large roadblock when attempting 
to drive pay for play initiatives lies within the lack of literature surrounding the topic. The 
absence of non-revenue generating sports in the MRP empirical literature creates an immediate 
excuse for the lack of data-driven initiatives. Thus, being the first research to examine a non-
revenue generating sport allows the gates for future research to expand with these findings and 
help complete the picture of overall athlete worth and impact. While ultimately the ability of 
both male and female swim programs to generate revenues is small in comparison to the research 
done on football and basketball programs it highlights the idea that there is more to involve in 
the discussion that just two sports (Brown, 1993; Brown & Jewell, 2006). 
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 With this in mind, future research could expand upon these findings to estimate revenue 
and expense models for other non-revenue generating sports as a comparison. More variables, 
such as coach salary, could be added into the existing set of variables to examine the issue of 
expenditures and revenues in swim programs.  
Limitations 
 One of the biggest limitations of this study is the inability to account for the salary of the 
head coach, coaching staff, and any other assistants. This is a potential issue because it is 
possible that the total expenses for NCAA swim programs may be significantly affected by the 
salary of their coach, as in the last decade non-revenue sport coaching salaries have doubled and 
non-coaching staff salaries have grown by 69% (Humphreys et al., 2011).We believe that the 
continued rising of coach salaries highlights that there is an excess of revenue somewhere within 
the athletic department that allows it to afford these increases in salaries. It is not an issue of how 
much revenue swimming generates but rather that the NCAA cannot easily make the assumption 
that paying athletes will be so prohibitively expense that they could not afford it. 
 Additionally, the revenue and expense data acquired from the EADA website is not 
perfect and has been found to have discrepancies between other data sources (Rascher, 2017). 
However, in most cases the public data does correspond well with the data provided to the 
NCAA, so it would seem to be a good data source for most sports. In this manner, due to the way 
that the Department of Education requires the NCAA to report their revenues and expenses, it is 
possible that a great deal of the expenses that are encumbered by swimming programs may be to 
actually pay staff and coaches. Therefore, it may be the case that the reported expenses are not 
actually reflective of the cost and value of operating a non-revenue sport such as swimming, but 
are more a function of total athletic department revenue. 
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Thus, it could be argued that the NCAA’s accounting and reporting procedures do not 
provide a clear picture. In turn it makes it difficult to understand the value of non-revenue sports 
and the distinction between revenue and non-revenue sports and the monetary value of their 
athletes. In the end, this shows that swimming itself may not be the financial roadblock to pay 
for play but rather that the discussion should be centered on the definition of athletes as amateurs 
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